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Abstract: 
The geopolitics of the Global Food Crisis and international trade has received limited scholarly 
attention, a significant omission given the major roles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
structuring world food production and trade flows and as a principal inter-state governing 
mechanism of the global agro-food system. Analysing recent international policy actions framing 
the WTO as a ‘fix’ to the Global Food Crisis, this article points to the value of a critical 
geopolitics of agro-power sensitive to the spatial reconfiguration of production and power in the 
global agro-food system, problematizing geospatial categories such as ‘North’ and ‘South’, and 
that takes seriously contests for control of geopolitical agents such as the WTO.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 Global Food Crisis and subsequent food price spikes are potent reminders of the 
enduring unpredictability and instability of the global agro-food system. Few analysts foresaw 
the crisis and fewer could have imagined the extent and duration of its consequences. High and 
volatile prices have disrupted global food flows and made concerns about access and supply of 
food preeminent in national and international policymaking. Widening asymmetries of producer 
power are evident in the inability of small-scale producers to benefit from higher prices; 
meanwhile transnational agro-food corporations enjoy record profits.1 Whereas the recent data 
suggests the crisis was slightly less severe than initially estimated, heightened levels of human 
deprivation and indignity remain a global concern given how unevenly the crisis’s effects were 
distributed, particularly across the African continent where the number of undernourished 
increased in absolute terms by twenty per cent.2 Unlike the World Food Crisis of 1974, where 
food prices quickly returned to pre-crisis levels after a couple of years, food prices remain above 
pre-crisis levels, thus pointing to a historical disjuncture from the longer-term decline of food 
prices (see Figure 1). 3 This disjuncture is commonly referred to as “the end of cheap food”. The 
durability of the present crisis, now running over five years and having erased much of the gains 
made in reducing world food insecurity over the past two decades, explains why food security 
remains high on the global policy agenda (unlike the 1974 crisis when political will to address 
world food insecurity quickly dissipated).4  
 
Figure 1. FAO Food Price Index in real terms, 1961-2010 
 
   Source: FAO 
 
 The end of cheap food is regularly discussed in terms of the crisis’ highly unequal effects 
on the capacity of individuals and households to access food. Yet an event such as the food crisis 
brings into sharp relief that much world hunger is not the inevitable outcome of natural 
phenomena but a form of geopolitical violence socially constructed through power relations.5 An 
important yet overlooked dimension of the food crisis and the end of cheap food is their 
influence on inter-state relations, and thus geopolitics. Recall that declining food prices was the 
distinguishing characteristic of the post-war global food order.6 Cheap food was the outcome of a 
particular geopolitics and geoeconomy of food, one where mounting agricultural structural 
surpluses in the North were accommodated by a mix of Southern food import dependency and an 
 
international food aid regime.7 This geoeconomics of food resulted from, and reproduced, a 
specific set of geopolitical relations that permitted, for example, the use of food by the United 
States (US) as an instrument of foreign policy ambitions in facilitating the reconstruction of post-
war Europe and selective parts of Asia.8 Later transformations of the geopolitical food order, 
including the restructuring of agriculture in the developing world towards non-food commodity 
exports in the 1970s/1980s followed by increasing corporate control of the global agro-food 
system in the 1990s and onwards, can be understood as historical outcomes consistent with the 
political economy conditions of cheap food.9  
 Power relations within geopolitical food orders require a set of institutional architectures 
to legitimize and facilitate them. Trade rules under the embedded liberalism of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its neoliberal successor, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), are such architectures.10 The Global Food Crisis occurred during a 
historical moment of intense geopolitical conflict at the WTO. It is not insignificant that since the 
crisis states have taken a multitude of actions that diverge from the WTO’s mission of freer trade 
in food; these actions include food export restrictions, national food self-sufficiency policies, 
efforts to regulate agricultural derivatives, and the acquisition of farmland abroad.11 Such actions 
illustrate that states are experimenting with alternatives to international trade to achieve national 
food security.12 Yet the question of how the Global Food Crisis may be altering the geopolitics of 
food security and the international trade system has received limited attention by political 
geographers.13 This is a significant omission given the WTO’s role as the principal inter-state 
forum for international and domestic food policy and in structuring global food relations, 
production and flows. This article argues for the value of a critical geopolitics analysis of inter-
state contests over food security at the WTO. The article is organized as follows. The first section 
outlines a framework for analysis for a critical geopolitics of agro-power at the WTO taking into 
account the shift towards a polycentric global agro-food system, problematizing the frame of 
North-South conflict, and taking seriously inter-state conflicts for control of institutions such as 
the WTO. The second section historically situates the international trade system in the 
geopolitics of food security. A third section analyses the recent geopolitics of food security at the 
WTO, including discourses framing the WTO as a solution to the crisis and contests over food 
security-related trade provisions, the negotiating of new food security-related trade provisions 
and the regulation of food export restrictions. 
 
 
A CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS OF AGRO-POWER 
This section develops three theoretical propositions informed by a critical geopolitics approach 
and the wider scholarship on power in the global system. This article is primarily interested in 
analysing inter-state power relations and thus takes states as the central unit of analysis. Also 
considered are international organizations, which are both arenas for inter-state politics and 
actors with their own interests. Private actors and global civil society are not directly analysed 
here.14 Such actors, while important for the study of the global food system in general, are not 
crucial to the study of geopolitics of food security at the WTO. This paper in particular cautions 
against uncritically “reading in” private power into the geopolitics of food security at the WTO. 
The scholarly literature on the WTO points to complex negotiating dynamic on agricultural trade 
issues where the interests of agro-food corporations are not preeminent.15 Thus agriculture at the 
WTO is distinct from other trade issues at the WTO, such as intellectual property rights and trade 
in services, where scholarship confirms corporations were central players in agenda-setting and 
 
drafting trade rules.16 The transnational food sovereignty movement, which emerged in 
opposition to the WTO, is active at the United Nations (UN) but refuses on principle to engage 
with the WTO.17 Development, social justice and environmental non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) continue to press for fairer trade policies at the WTO through their advocacy, capacity-
building activities and lobbying of member states and the WTO secretariat. Yet NGOs remain 
outside the corridors of power at the WTO and have limited influence on the outcomes of inter-
state negotiations.18  
 The approach adopted in this article takes seriously John Agnew’s warning about reifying 
the state, as well as similar methodological concerns noted by scholars of the internationalization 
of the state.19 There are practical reasons for a state-focused approach to the study of the WTO 
because this institution features an idiosyncratic negotiating structure that reinforces traditional 
inter-state power relations by encouraging, for example, coalition-building and small group 
bargaining dynamics, and deepening international-domestic political linkages (what Robert 
Putnam called ‘two-level games’).20 Other considerations are the unique historical trajectory of 
agriculture and food in the international trade system, including the specificity of food trade 
policy under the WTO’s remit that institutionalizes and reinforces states preference to retain 
scope for intervention in agricultural markets.21 Future research should aim for greater synthesis 
of the ways state, private and other forms of power play out and interact in the global agro-food 
system; however, the task of this article is confined to the elucidation of inter-state dynamics. 
I now turn to introducing the three theoretical propositions informed by a critical 
geopolitics of the global agro-food system. The first proposition is that a critical geopolitics 
approach renders more visible the spatial reconfiguration of production and power in the global 
agro-food system, and their representation in global food politics. Historically, the study of 
global food politics has taken US political hegemony and the market dominance of Northern 
agro-business as a central feature of a globalizing agro-food system.22 However, the Global Food 
Crisis is occurred during a period of transition away from a Northern dominated international 
food regime towards a polycentric one.23 Global food production today is no longer dominated 
by the Northern grain producing nations of the US, European Union (EU), Canada, and 
Australia. Southern agro-food powerhouses such as Brazil, Thailand, Vietnam and Argentina 
make up an increasing and major share of world agricultural production, trade and consumption. 
Moreover, many of these countries compete directly (and successfully) with the US and other 
Northern states in third country markets for temperate products such as wheat and soybeans. 
Another important and related development is that Southern countries are major producer of 
‘flex crops’; these are crops that have multiple food and fuel uses (e.g., palm oil, soybeans, 
sugarcane, maize, etc.) and are critical to the emerging global biofuel complex and political 
economy of the ‘green economy’ (See Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Brazil, India, Russia and China’s share 
 in selected flex crop production, world total (%) 
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Source: Borras, Franco and Wang (2012); FAO 
 
 
The spatial reconfiguration of food production and trade flows is accompanied by a 
corresponding geopolitical shift in agro-power observable along multiple fronts of global food 
and agriculture governance.24 During the current Doha Development Round (DDA) of WTO 
agriculture negotiations a group of emerging countries led by Brazil, China and India are 
successfully challenging the dominance of the US and EU. Another example is the newly created 
agriculture ministers grouping at the Group of Twenty (G20) that sets global policy priorities on 
agriculture reform and food security issues.25 Parallel to these political developments, the 
expansion of agro-food corporations from emerging states confirms private agro-power is too 
becoming polycentric.26 Take the Brazilian-based firms JBS and Brazil Foods that rank at the top 
of global market share for meat and grains, and are consolidating their positions through direct 
acquisitions of agro-food interests in the North.27 Abu Dhabi recently created a food-trading firm 
to compete with Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland.28 Chinese-firm Shuanghui is purchasing 
US-based Smithfield Foods, the world’s largest pork producer. Not only is the transnational 
reach of corporations from emerging states rapidly expanding; such expansion blurs the public-
private divide. In many emerging states, government and firms work closely together and in 
some cases there is direct state support (i.e., export promotion, financing, commercial diplomacy, 
etc.) for national agro-food firms to expand abroad.29 The transition towards a polycentric global 
agro-food system is underway where traditional Northern states and agro-food firms no longer 
dominate as previously. In turn, the transition opens new geopolitical space to reconstitute agro-
power relations, including the modification of institutional architectures. 
Second, a critical geopolitics of agro-power problematizes existing geospatial categories 
such as North and South through which struggles over the agro-food system are generally 
articulated. Global food studies have a tendency to regard North-South struggles as the most 
significant political fault-line, such as scholarship on agricultural structural adjustment in the 
global South.30 A North-South conflict frame has been powerful in explaining the past yet a shift 
towards a polycentric global agro-food system suggests that analysis of conflicts necessitates a 
multivalent approach.31 The point here is not that North-South categorizations are no longer 
relevant but that its uncritical use obscures new and different geopolitical tensions. Recent 
Chinese and Gulf States’ land grabs in Africa for outsourced food production are articulations of 
 
new spatial dynamics of agro-power where “Southern” states seek greater economic and political 
control of food production, distribution and consumption abroad.32 The shift towards 
polycentrism and the accompanying multidirectional flows of agro-power require new/refined 
analytical categories to capture the changing spatiality of power. Meta-concepts such as 
geoeconomics are helpful for understanding changing relations between the geography of 
economy in the global agro-food system or approaches that situate transnational contests for 
control over global resources and governance institutions as interrelated processes.33  
This article employs the categorization of net-food exporting (NFEs) and net-food 
importing (NFIs) states for the purpose of analysing multidirectional power flows at the WTO. 
There is no consensus definition for these categories, nevertheless they offer a useful organizing 
frame to analyse the geopolitics of the global agro-food system, especially with regard to their 
value as a proxy for a state’s relative vulnerability to food insecurity.34 In the case of NFIs, 
which purchase and import food from international markets for national food security, this gro
of states is most vulnerable to food price volatility and changes in global food availability. NFEs 
are sensitive to volatility and market trends but their vulnerability to food insecurity is far le
affected since such states generally produce quantities of food surplus to domestic consumption. 
Imports are primarily for luxury foods (i.e., tropical fruit, cocoa, etc.). A practical reason for 
using NFIs and NFEs in geopolitical analysis is that states use these categories in their political 
discourse and negotiation strategies at the WTO (see below). Helen Hawthorne argues that 
group-making categories and discourse are crucial for understanding the geopolitics of 
international trade; the recognition of the category of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) at the 
WTO resulted in improved market access for these countries and enhanced their general 
treatment in trade relationships.
up 
ss 
35 The categories of NFIs and NFEs are fluid and thus can 
capture relative shifts in a state’s agro-power/vulnerability to food insecurity over time.36 For 
example, since 2000 an additional fifteen states transitioned from NFEs to NFIs.37 Also, NFEs 
and NFIs do not fall neatly along North-South lines. Many NFIs are located in the global South, 
such as most Sub-Saharan African states, but also include middle-income countries (e.g., Gulf 
States, Korea) and advanced economies (e.g., Japan, Switzerland, Israel). NFEs are a highly 
diverse group that range from advanced economies (e.g., US, EU, Canada, Australia), “new” 
agro-powers (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Thailand, Vietnam), and (re)emerging agro-powers (e.g., 
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan).38 These categories make clear asymmetries of agro-power at the 
global level since the vast majority of the world’s states are NFIs (See Table 1). As a 
consequence, to achieve food security NFIs depend on world markets and good political and 
trading relationships with agro-powers.39 The geopolitical/geoeconomic conditions faced by 
NFIs illustrate that territorial sovereignty, food production and food security rarely align in a 
corresponding manner.40  
 
 
Table 1. Net Exporters and Importers by International Food Trade 
 No. of Countries in Raw Food Trade 
Country Group         Net Exporter Net Importer Total 
Industrial Groups 13 20 33 
Middle Income, all 36 69 105 
Low-income, all 16 42 58 
World, Total 65 131 196 
Source: Adopted from Ng and Askoy (2008); UN COMM Trade Statistics 
 
 
 Third, a critical geopolitics of agro-power alerts us to the inter-sate contests over 
geopolitical agents to exert greater control in the governance of the global agro-food system. US 
hegemony is evident at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, where it enjoys 
the majority voting rights and final say on policy. 41 However, there has been growing scholarly 
attention to the limits of US hegemony in international organizations, including the use of 
governance institutions to the detriment of US power and legitimacy. US withdrawal from the 
International Criminal Court in response to unfavourable legal decisions, the Landmine Ban 
Treaty (which the US refused to ratify) and landmark WTO legal decisions finding US cotton 
subsidies illegal illustrate that control of institutions is always contested. Following this, this 
article treats formal international organizations as geopolitical agents over which control is 
contested due to their central role in the maintenance or remaking of the geopolitics food order.42 
The diffusion of agro-power in a polycentric global agro-food system suggests the need to take 
contests over geopolitical agents more seriously, in this case, the WTO. In the context of a 
polycentric global agro-food system, we should expect to see new and different inter-state 
conflicts in seeking to steer the WTO towards positions that confirm and enhance the agro-power 
of certain states, in particular that of NFEs that have (at least historically) disproportionately 
influenced outcomes in multilateral trade negotiations.  
 
 
PRE-CRISIS GEOPOLITICS OF FOOD SECURITY AT THE WTO 
The WTO may not be the first international organization that comes to mind when one speaks 
about the geopolitics and governance of food security compared to the Rome-based UN food 
agencies or even the World Bank.43 Yet the WTO and its predecessor regime, the GATT, are 
important for understanding the changing configurations of agro-power and inter-state struggles 
over the global agro-food system. The WTO is a geopolitical agent central to regulating 
international agriculture trade, domestic agriculture policy, and by extension, food security at the 
national, international and transnational levels. The GATT governed international trade between 
1947 and 1994 but purposely excluded agriculture. This exclusion was due to US refusal to ratify 
the 1948 Havana Charter that would have shifted control of food policy to a proposed 
International Trade Organization.44 Instead, states agreed to a multilateral trade agreement, the 
GATT, that became the platform for successive rounds of tariff reductions on industrial goods. 
The exclusion of agriculture in the GATT accommodated US preferences and provided an 
institutional architecture facilitating a geopolitical food order that Harriet Friedmann labelled a 
wheat-based food regime, which embedded US agricultural exports and its firms in a privileged 
position in the post-war period.45 The wheat food regime made American food exports relatively 
cheap thereby permitting US agro-power, food import dependence and geopolitical clientalism to 
go hand and hand. An important point here is the GATT (by excluding agriculture) maintained an 
international division of food (in)security that was super-imposed upon natural topography by a 
geopolitical food order anchored in US agro-power.46 The GATT’s history is consistent with a 
North-South conflict framing (but also North-North conflicts as well) as Southern states and 
other Northern NFEs repeatedly challenged the legitimacy and inequity of the geopolitical food 
order. Such challenges occurred primarily in multilateral trade negotiations as states sought to 
insert agriculture and food security concerns into the GATT system (also at the UN Conference 
on Trade and Development in the late 1960s to late 970s). States efforts to challenge the US-
anchored geopolitical food order and regulate agriculture at the international level failed most 
strikingly during the Kennedy Round (1964-1967) and Tokyo Round (1973-1979) of GATT 
 
negotiations in the face of US resistance.47  
Yet the institutional architecture of the geopolitical food order changed dramatically in 
the 1980s during the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of GATT. A key shift in the Uruguay Round 
was that the US and EU took the lead in seeking to insert agriculture into the GATT. By this time 
these states were fiscally exhausted in part by massive agricultural subsidy programs from a 
prolonged a transatlantic food trade war.48 Concurrent at this time was the US and EU’s 
ideological turn towards neoliberalism that reset the tenor of economic policy in support of 
‘freeing’ agricultural trade. The outcome of the Uruguay Round resulted in the inclusion of 
agriculture into the newly established WTO under a new agreement, the Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA). The AoA was a trade deal on terms set by the US and EU, the dominant agro-
powers at the time.49 The AoA is significant because it internationalized agriculture trade and 
food policy through legally binding commitments on states with the objective of progressively 
reducing agricultural tariffs, set binding limit on national agricultural subsidies and initiated 
policy convergence across the global North and South towards a market-driven global agro-food 
regime.50  Food security issues fall under the scope of the AoA but clearly as subsidiary to the 
overarching goal of trade liberalization. The AoA included provisions that defined permissible 
national interventions for domestic food security (e.g., domestic food aid, agricultural extension 
programs, crop insurance) and also at the international level (e.g., international food aid, export 
credit financing, export restrictions).51 Trade friction among agro-powers and NFIs was 
considerable during the Uruguay Round. Japan and Korea’s demand to limit the marketization of 
food import policies was defeated by aggressive negotiation strategies by NFEs (i.e., US, 
Australia, Canada, Argentina and Brazil). Southern NFIs were relatively more successful by 
working as a bargaining coalition and negotiated for a side-agreement with agro-powers for 
guarantees of food aid and food import financing in anticipation of higher food prices, an 
outcome widely expected upon implementation of the AoA.52 Negotiating food security at the 
GATT illustrates that whereas NFIs may have limited control over physical food production, they 
can seek to exert other forms of control over food through geopolitical agents, in this case, 
through rule-making at the GATT/WTO.  
The current Doha Development Round (DDA) of trade negotiations, launched in 2001, is 
the most protracted round in the history of the GATT/WTO. The DDA has been deadlocked since 
July 2008 with inter-state disagreement on agriculture and food security issues a key reason.53 
Analysts are still unsure if the agreement on a subset of trade issues at the 2013 Bali Ministerial 
Doha will be sufficient to break the impasse. The DDA has marked a notable shift in agro-power 
at the WTO with the success of a new developing country bargaining coalition, the Group of 
Twenty (Ag-G20) led by Brazil, India and China (but not the same as the G20 that replaced the 
G8), in blocking the US and EU and advancing their own trade agenda.54 The Ag-G20’s 
substantial influence on the Doha Round is an important indicator of the transition towards a 
polycentric geopolitical food order. The Ag-G20 is notably producing new patterns of inter-state 
conflicts at the WTO. In the agricultural negotiations inter-state conflicts feature new discourses 
by the Ag-G20 for  “development” and “equitable” distribution of the gains from trade. As 
Kristen Hopewell observes, these new discourses are strategically created and used by emerging 
agro-powers to demonize Northern agricultural subsidies to galvanize political support from the 
global South and to strengthen their own position in negotiating for deeper agricultural trade 
liberalization.55  
Already prior to the Global Food Crisis the geopolitical conflicts over food security were 
significant. The Ag-G20’s targeting of US and EU “dumping” of subsidized agricultural goods is 
 
one issue that was of common interest to emerging NFEs and food insecure states.56 Rules on 
dumping are a well-known asymmetry in the AoA, that due to technical intricacies that will not 
be addressed here left the majority of developing country WTO members (except emerging 
NFEs) without safeguard policies to stop dumping at the border.57 Agricultural dumping is an 
issue where the Ag-G20 allied early with the Group of Thirty Three (G33) – a bargaining 
coalition of developing countries demanding agricultural safeguards and led by India – to 
successfully negotiate two new trade policy tools. These are the Special Safeguard Mechanism 
(SSM) and the Special Products provisions, with the former designed to permit developing 
countries to respond to dumping by raising agricultural tariffs above their current bound limits 
set out in the AoA once the DDA is completed.58 The rules of the SSM and Special Products 
make clear these policy tools can be invoked for reasons of national food security, in particular to 
protect poor and vulnerable small farmers. The technical details of how the SSM will operate are 
highly contentious and not yet agreed upon.59 From the outside looking in the SSM appears to be 
a Southern victory over the North. Yet a closer examination reveals that even within the Ag-G20 
there is disagreement over the design of the SSM. Emerging agro-powers such as Argentina, 
Brazil and Thailand face dumping infrequently and thus favour a more limited version than what 
is proposed by the G33, a group of countries that contains many NFIs and are more frequently 
and adversely effected by dumping. Whereas diverging positions on the SSM is unlikely to break 
the Ag-G20-G33 alliance, it is a potent reminder of ever more fractured geopolitics at the WTO. 
Also visible prior to the crisis were geopolitical tensions between Southern agro-powers and 
NFIs. In the first phase of the DDA negotiations (2001-2004) NFIs persuaded WTO members to 
explore the creation of a food-import financing facility (FIFF) to assist NFIs experiencing 
temporary difficulties meeting the cost of food imports. Advanced technical work on the FIFF 
took place during those years with technical assistance from the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), World Bank and IMF.60 The FFIF proposal was dropped in 2004 in part due 
to rejection by established and emerging agro-powers.  
There has been considerable debate about the consequences of a failed DDA for world 
food security. It has been argued that the WTO’s continued deadlock might be preventing 
agricultural trade liberalization that could be unfavourable for NFIs, for example, to the degree a 
new AoA may produce reforms that further drive up food prices.61 Jennifer Clapp argues that the 
WTO deadlock has dissipated political momentum for progressive reform on food security and 
commodities trade vital to the development interests of most poor WTO members.62 Another 
reading is that a failed DDA means forestalling the institutionalizing of a neoliberal global food 
order; however, this would serve to reinforce existing power asymmetries in the global agro-food 
system rather than undermine them.63  
 
 
THE WTO AND THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS  
The causes and consequences of the Global Food Crisis are the subject of a considerable body of 
research across the social science disciplines and within policymaking circles. Knowledge 
production about the Global Food Crisis is intimately linked with discourses of justifying or 
challenging the geopolitical food order.64 Contending perspectives on the crisis inform real world 
inter-state contests for control over geopolitical agents as the latter are involved in knowledge 
production about the crisis while being tasked with implementing the ‘solutions’. Two 
contending perspectives are especially relevant for contextualizing geopolitical struggles. A first 
perspective frames the causes of the Global Food Crisis as a scientific controversy, 
 
understanding it as a singular event to be explained by identifying its proximate causes and 
inferring from this the appropriate solutions. This perspective is most associated with academic 
and professional economists from (mostly US) universities and international organizations.65 
This self-styled scientific controversy revolves around the problem of determining which one of 
the many oft-cited policy drivers and external events are the principal cause, and how best to 
employ econometric modelling to determine causal relationships among many possible factors. 
Within the (economic) debate internal to this perspective, the principal causal factors cited are 
US and EU agrofuel policies, rising oil prices and, to a slightly lesser extent, the depreciation of 
the US dollar.66 The changing appetites of consumers in emerging markets are accorded very 
minor explanatory power and so is financial speculation. A second perspective situates the 
Global Food Crisis as the outcome of longer-term, unresolved contradictions of the global agro-
food system, and focuses on the crisis’s broader socio-ecological consequences rather than 
merely its proximate causes. This structural approach involves a different configuration of 
knowledge producers of social scientists (however few economists), professional researchers and 
activists working on a range of food, development and social justice issues. This second reading 
of the crisis is heavily informed by dependency theory and food regime scholarship. 
Accordingly, the crisis is understood as prefigured by historical processes of internationalization 
and restructuring of world agriculture.67 Whereas earlier agricultural restructuring is understood 
to have set the stage for the crisis, new dynamics such as the finacialization of food and 
emergence of a global agrofuel economy are situated as accelerating unequal global food 
relations (and changing relations between capital and nature more broadly).68 Consequently, the 
debate about the causes and consequences of the crisis can also be understood as expressions of 
agro-power (or the lack of it) because states (and non-state actors) have differentiated but very 
unequal resources and capacity to produce knowledge and truth claims about the crisis (i.e., to 
diagnosis the problem and to offer and promote solutions; or the basis upon which to decide 
which account of the crisis is more ‘true’ or policy option more ‘effective’). Most important for 
the purposes of this article are the ways in which knowledge production and discourse continue 
to shape the debate about the role of international trade as a cause and solution to the crisis, and 
thus the role of the WTO.  
   
WTO to the rescue? Or Global Food Crisis to the rescue of the WTO? 
 The DDA ground to a halt at the Geneva mini-ministerial just as the global community 
grasped the enormity of the Global Food Crisis. 2008 was a low point for the WTO with states 
public acknowledging their positions were too far apart for a likely agreement in the near future. 
Trade analysts expressed concerns that the WTO was not just “dysfunctional” but that the 
deadlock could render the WTO irrelevant as states shifted their attention away from multilateral 
trade negotiations to pursue bilateral and regional trade agreements.69 Global policy elites were 
quick to proclaim the WTO as a potential solution to the crisis, which offered a new diagnosis of 
the crisis. For instance, consider the G8’s 2008 Statement on Global Food Security that declared:  
 
Food security also requires a robust world market and trade system for food and 
agriculture. Rising food prices are adding inflationary pressures and generating 
macroeconomic imbalances especially for some low-income countries. In this regard, we 
will work toward the urgent and successful conclusion of an ambitious, comprehensive and 
balanced Doha Round.70  
 
 
This quote illustrates a new framing of the crisis – one in which insufficient international 
agricultural trade is a cause of the crisis. The neoclassical economic logic implicit in this framing 
is that trade liberalization reduces market volatility and spurs economic development. This free-
trade-for-food-security framing of the food crisis may appear cynical, since it echoes the 
standard neoliberal argument for free trade (and the position of agro-powers at the WTO). Yet 
this new framing is important in several respects. First, the framing of a long-term response to 
the Global Food Crisis as dependent on completion of the DDA links the crisis and WTO in a 
new way in global policy discourse. As is discussed further below, this new linkage is very 
flexible and has been used by both NFEs and NFIs to support their positions at the WTO. In 
addition, the linking of the food crisis and the WTO alters the perceived geopolitical stakes by 
creating an expectation among states and other actors that the WTO should produce an outcome 
that addresses world food insecurity. This framing of the food crisis/WTO relationship is now the  
“new normal” in global policy discourse. All inter-governmental policy statements on world food 
security explicitly refer to completing the WTO DDA as an integral part of the solution.71 For 
example, the G20 recently declared that “a more stable, predictable, distortion-free, open and 
transparent trading system, including as regards agriculture, has a critical role to play to promote 
food security”.72  
 Geopolitical agents were quick to reinforce the idea of free-trade-for-food security  in 
global policy discourse. Then-WTO Director General Pascal Lamy emerged as a principal 
pitchman by repeatedly pressing this case to the media, government ministers and wider policy 
and academic audiences.73 Below is a characteristic intervention by Lamy to the WTO members: 
 
The reasons why we must conclude the [WTO Doha] Round this year are visible to all of 
us and they are becoming more critical by the day.... [we] have also witnessed an 
unprecedented escalation in food prices world wide which has had negative effects 
particularly on developing countries that depend on imports for their food security or are 
net food buyers....[a] WTO deal could help soften the impact of high prices by tackling the 
systemic distortions in the international market for food.74  
 
Lamy’s quote is typical of statements during the height of the Global Food Crisis that both linked 
the food crisis to the Doha Round and emphasized the urgency of the situation to prompt 
‘decisive’ action among WTO members. The WTO is not the sole geopolitical agent advancing 
such a position. Then-World Bank President, Robert Zoellick, argued passionately in the 
international press that concluding the Doha Round offered a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to 
promote food security in developing countries as part of a ‘New Food Deal’.75 At the WTO’s 
2011 Aid for Trade meeting, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon stressed that the conclusion of 
the Doha Round would “contribute immensely” to increasing global food security among the 
poorest and most vulnerable people.76 Concluding the Doha Round is affirmed by the UN High-
Level Task Force on the World Food Security Crisis (HLTF), the body which steers the 
multilateral response to the food crisis and of which the WTO is a member.77  
 This linking of the food crisis and the WTO has caused WTO officials to emerge as new 
players in global food security policy. Since the crisis the WTO Director General has come to 
participate on an equal footing with the heads of the FAO and World Food Programme (WFP) in 
high-level deliberations on world food security.78 WTO officials now work alongside experts 
from the FAO, WFP, and World Bank in inter-agency panels advising the G8 and G20 on policies 
to address food price volatility and improve agricultural market information.79 It is important to 
 
note that prior to the food crisis the WTO did not actively engage in global policy discussions 
and/or technical work on food security. In the past, food security issues used to be regarded as 
beyond WTO officials’ competencies and officials regularly deferred to outside experts from the 
FAO, WFP and academia. The now routinized role of the WTO as a legitimate and authoritative 
voice on food security affords its officials greater influence over the agenda and norms in the 
governance of food security than before the crisis.80  
 
Negotiating Food Security in the DDA After the Global Food Crisis 
 The post-crisis geopolitics of food security illustrate the myriad of ways in which states 
are deploying the discourse of free-trade-for-food security to seek control over the WTO. There 
are two discernable phases of this. The first phase ranges from July 2008 to early 2011. During 
this phase, key events were the July 2008 Ministerial and the December 2009 WTO Ministerial 
meetings. During this period the top priority for WTO members was to prevent a total collapse of 
the DDA. It is also during this period when agro-powers began to instrumentalize the Global 
Food Crisis for such ends. Alieen Kwa of the South Centre, a prominent global South think-tank, 
reported that behind closed doors at the WTO, food exporting nations were using the crisis to 
pressure food insecure nations into accepting a WTO deal.81 Moreover, the key NFEs (US, EU, 
Australia and Brazil) instrumentalized the crisis in an effort to roll back food security “friendly” 
gains tabled in the draft agricultural modalities agreement. During informal discussions among 
WTO members in 2008 and 2009, NFEs stressed to G33 members and NFIs that in the post-
crisis context that the SSM and Special Products were inappropriate policy tools because 
dumping occurs when prices fall and not increase.82 NFEs pointed out that many food insecure 
countries temporarily reduced tariffs on food imports, an action agro-powers argued was proof 
that the appropriate policy direction was to deepen liberalization by negotiating lower overall 
tariff rates.  
 Agro-powers use of the food crisis to critique the SSM is not simply a technical policy 
debate but must be understood as part of wider geopolitical struggles. Agricultural tariffs are one 
of the few policy levers to regulate agricultural markets and smooth out food price fluctuations 
available in the AoA to the majority of developing WTO members; these states do not have 
recourse to alternative policies such as price controls or food reserves.83 By comparison, agro-
powers have recourse to more options both under the AoA and also simply because of their 
structural position in the global agro-food system as NFEs. NFEs’ strategy to frame agricultural 
tariffs as “anti-food security”, a framing built on knowledge production by the World Bank and 
mainstream agricultural economists, seeks to hide a complex reality and asymmetric power 
relations. Most NFIs and developing country WTO members have relatively low average 
agricultural tariffs that are a direct result of structural adjustment programs.84 Agricultural tariffs 
remain an important source of public revenue, especially for states lacking effective tax systems. 
Tariffs on food imports are not unproblematic and do not necessarily lead to improved food 
security outcomes. However, the post-crisis context, where the free-trade-for-food security  
discourse is the new normal in global policy debates, has shifted the battleground over 
agricultural tariffs. The mainstream interpretation of the food crisis has strengthened the position 
of agro-powers at the WTO and their objective to reduce agricultural tariffs. The post-crisis 
political economy conditions are supposedly undermining the earlier logic behind the SSM 
thereby putting food insecure states more strongly on the defensive in agricultural trade 
negotiations.85 
Despite agro-powers’ critique of the SSM there appears to have been minimal substantive 
 
inter-state discussion on trade-related food security issues informed by the crisis at the WTO 
during this first phase. Even though food security is part of the WTO’s mandate and is a key 
issue in the DDA negotiations, a search of declassified official WTO documents published 
between 2008-2010 confirms that the Global Food Crisis did not feature in the institutions 
regular inter-state work.86 Only one record exists of a discussion among states: a 2009 
presentation by a group of LDCs on the crisis at the meeting of a minor WTO sub-committee.87 
It appears the crisis was discussed informally but not in the key WTO decision-making bodies 
such as the General Council or Committee on Agriculture, which could have been expected 
given the prominence of the issue and the WTO’s secretariat work on the multilateral response to 
the food crisis. This lack of WTO-based deliberations on food security is even more curious 
given that during this period agro-powers made strong statements about importance of the WTO 
for the solving the food crisis. It appears that during this first period the discourse of free-trade-
for-food security was prominent but in comparison there was not a concerted effort to translate 
this discourse into new trade rules. However, efforts to frame of the WTO as a fix to the crisis 
spurred considerable counter-geopolitics. In advance of the July 2008 Ministerial, over 200 
NGOs mobilizing under the umbrella of “Our World is Not for Sale” launched a campaign 
directed at the heads of the WTO and global policymakers to reject the WTO as a solution to 
food crisis.88 Global civil society criticized the draft agricultural modalities for not providing 
much in the way of pro-food security outcomes. In particular, these actors voiced concern that 
existing WTO rules constrained food-insecure states’ (including NFIs) policy space to build up 
their food security independence, a view that was echoed in a report by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food.89 
A second phase from 2011 to the present is characterized by states’ efforts to translate the 
discourse of free-trade-for-food security into new agricultural trade rules at the WTO. A key 
turning point was the lead up to the 2011 WTO Ministerial meeting in Geneva when members 
identified food security as a high priority issue and called for a new program of work on food 
security to be part of the DDA.90 Yet no specific plan was tabled at the 2011 Ministerial as WTO 
members continued to read food security through different geopolitical lenses, yet all invoking 
variations of the free-trade-for-food security discourse. For example, Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (BRICs) identified the “distorting subsidies granted by developed economies” as 
generating food insecurity.91 The Cairns Group of developed and developing net-exporters 
(which includes Brazil) stressed that “policies that distort production and trade in agricultural 
products can impede the achievement of long term food security” in a lightly veiled criticism of 
both US and EU subsidies but also the SSM.92 The G33 emphasized the importance of Special 
Products and the SSM to enable them to achieve food security and development goals.93 The 
friction over food security at the 2011 Ministerial was notable because even three years after the 
Global Food Crisis WTO members were still in disagreement on how to treat food security. By 
comparison in other global policy spaces such as the UN system and G8/G20 states were able to 
reach consensus far more quickly. Inter-state conflicts over food security at the WTO confirm the 
importance of this geopolitical agent – the stakes being rules that govern the global ago-food 
system and distribute its benefits and costs – and the difficulty in forging “consensus” when 
asymmetric power relations are brought to the fore.  
The most recent illustration of geopolitical struggles for control of the WTO occurred at 
the December 2013 WTO Ministerial in Bali, Indonesia. An important development in the lead 
up to the Bali Ministerial was the efforts to achieve a so-called early harvest on trade issues, 
including agriculture and food security. The early harvest was put forward as a means to reach a 
 
compromise at Bali that would address the immediate food security concerns of NFIs and other 
food insecure countries (which have become more acute since 2008) and also signal that the 
WTO has an important role in world food security. A key element of the early harvest was based 
on an earlier G33 proposal to omit public food stockholding to be counted as trade-distorting 
support and thereby not be subject to the subsidy limits under the AoA.94 A second element in 
the proposed early harvest was a G33 call for states to be exempt from WTO legal challenge in 
cases where implementing stockholding programs for food security surpasses the subsidy 
spending limits in the AoA.95 The G33 proposal on its own is not radical as it is consistent with
the post-crisis global policy consensus that includes an emphasis on greater public action and 
investment in food security.
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96 Yet this proposal is controversial at the WTO because NFEs/ ag
powers view it with scepticism and fear it would set a precedent of permitting trade policies that 
deviate from the AoA’s norms and rules. Perhaps not fully appreciated is the degree to which th
G33 proposal challenges the underlying logic of existing WTO rules by reopening debate on how
to define and classify an agricultural subsidy, which agro-powers recognize risks unsettling not 
just the DDA but the original intention of the Uruguay Round agreement to remake agricultural 
food trade along the logic of comparative advantage and economies of scale. Division over the 
G33 proposal is strongest between NFEs and NFIs and does not fall along North-South lines, 
with the US, Brazil, EU, Canada, Australia, Thailand and Argentina particularly hostile to 
rewriting WTO rules to accommodate public food stockholding.97 Food stockholding emerged as 
the most contentious issue at the WTO Ministerial in Bali and threatened to derail the talks. 
Disagreement between the US and India (which recently passed a national food stockholding 
bill) in Bali on food stockholding garnered the most international attention, and required 
brokering by the WTO Director General to reach a conclusion. However, the geopolitics of food 
stockholding should not be viewed solely as a US versus India but instead these pivotal agro-
powers were representing larger constituencies at the WTO, in this case NFEs and NFIs/food 
insecure states respectively. The Bali Ministerial has been spun by the WTO as a major succes
and its outcome, the Bali Package, contained an interim agreement with conditions for when 
food stockholding programs may be exempt from the AoA and legal challenge.98 Howeve
Bali Package on food stockholding is only an interim agreement. States are intended to neg
permanent and comprehensive rules on food stockholding for consideration at the 2015 WTO 
Ministerial. The prominence and divisiveness of food stockholding at Bali confirms the 
deepening of geopolitical struggles over food security and
 
Geopolitics of food export restrictions 
Geopolitical struggles for control of the global agro-food system are also evident in efforts to 
create new rules on food export restrictions at the WTO. Food export restrictions are government 
imposed bans on the export, sale and shipment of staple grains or other strategic foodstuffs. 
Thirty-three states implemented export restrictions during the crisis.99 Food export restrictions 
were the object of vociferous criticism by established agro-powers, international organizations 
and academics for aggravating and reinforcing the crisis.100 Russia, Ukraine, Argentina, 
Thailand, Vietnam, and India were singled out for particular criticism, with econometric studies 
directly linking their export restrictions to the doubling of wheat and tripling rice prices in 
2007/2008.101 These price spikes spurred a new global policy debate on food export restrictions. 
Prior to the crisis established NFEs, NFI and most economists had long argued export 
restrictions were hazardous for the globalized food economy.102 Criticism of export restrictions 
since the food crisis has intensified and is articulated as an international cooperation problem. In 
 
the wake of the crisis, the WTO called food export restrictions “beggar thy neighbour” 
policies.103 As put by the former head of the International Food Policy and Research Institute 
(IFPRI): 
 
How effective are these [food export restrictions] responses likely to be? Price controls and 
changes in import and export policies may begin to address the problems of poor 
consumers who find that they can no longer afford an adequate diet for a healthy life. But 
some of these policies are likely to backfire by making the international market smaller and 
more volatile.104  
 
The mainstream economic consensus is that food export restrictions have negative 
externalities for the global food economy and require more stringent international 
regulation.105 Since the crisis, there has been an emerging global norm in favour of 
strengthening international rules to regulate food export restrictions.106 Philip McMichael 
argues that this new framing of export restrictions as a global public bad is a highly politicized 
acts that seeks to legitimate the rhetoric of trade liberalization to advance “neo-liberal food 
security”.107  
 The intensified criticism of food export restrictions masks geopolitical struggles 
because such criticism serves an agenda-setting function that has worked to focus blame on 
certain NFEs’ policies while shifting attention away from US and EU agrofuel policies, which 
are widely recognized as a principal cause of the food crisis.108 Lost in this geopolitical blame 
game is that states implemented export restrictions only after food prices already began to 
rise; making this an amplificatory but not primary driver of the crisis. In addition, the targeted 
criticism of emerging NFEs that imposed restrictions obscures the fact that thirty-three 
countries introduced restrictions, a larger set of states not confined to any region of the world 
and that included many NFIs.109 The widespread use of restrictions by one sixth of the 
world’s states suggests that geopolitical tensions are not likely to be easily papered over.
States continue to evoke their sovereign right to protect national food security, a position 
succinctly expressed by India’s foreign minister that “every country must first ensure its 
food security” before considering the consequences for international markets 110
 
own 
.   
The WTO was identified early on by states as the appropriate arena to address food 
export restrictions.111 In 2008, the G8 declared it “imperative to remove export restrictions” and 
resume the Doha Round to introduce “stricter disciplines on these trade actions which prolong 
and aggravate the situation, and hinder humanitarian purchases of food commodities”.112 The 
WTO was a logical choice to address food export restrictions because the AoA includes rules on 
food export restrictions under Article XXII, which permits them on a temporary basis to address 
shortages of critical foodstuffs.113 Earlier in the Doha Round, WTO members discussed 
strengthening food export restrictions, however, the view at that time was that these policies 
were a minor trade issue.114 Following the food crisis, export restrictions have featured more 
prominently in inter-state negotiations of WTO rules. Recent geopolitical contests illustrate a 
complex dynamic, with one contest occurring between emerging and established agro-powers 
and another between NFEs and NFIs. At the 2011 WTO Ministerial, the EU tabled a proposal to 
exempt humanitarian food aid purchases by the WFP from export restrictions. In this case, the 
EU proposal was a repackaging of an earlier G20 recommendation.115 An unexpected twist 
occurred at the 2011 Ministerial in that certain G20 members, in this case Argentina, Brazil, 
India and China, rejected the proposal. Rejection of the EU/G20 proposal was not along North-
 
South lines, with other G20 members – Indonesia, Chile and Mexico – and most NFIs in favour. 
According to press reports, emerging agro-powers claimed their rejection of the proposal was on 
the basis of preventing a precedent that G20 decisions might be interpreted as binding on WTO 
members.116 A critical geopolitics provides an alternative reading that suggests emerging agro-
powers rejected the EU proposal in order to block an effort by established agro-powers to reset 
the parameters of the agricultural negotiations since the food crisis.117 Emerging agro-powers, in 
particular Argentina, have sought to foreclose multiple attempts by the EU and US to reopen the 
DDA negotiating agenda precisely on food export restrictions and related export policy 
measures. Argentina’s position is that doing so is a thinly veiled attack to reduce its agricultural 
policy space; it relies on restrictions to enhance export competitiveness by indirectly promoting 
value-added export processing. It also requires export taxes to finance social protection 
programs.118 Therefore the rejection of the EU proposal should not be simply interpreted as case 
of emerging agro-powers failing to lead on food security as some commentators have suggested. 
Instead, the rejection of EU proposal on food export restrictions is embedded in deeper 
geopolitical struggles among agro-powers for control of the WTO.  
NFIs have also sought to remake WTO rules on food export restrictions. In April 2008 
(some months before the apex of the crisis), Switzerland and Japan introduced a negotiating 
proposal calling for more stringent criteria to be met before WTO members could impose a 
restriction, including the establishment of a supranational committee of trade experts to 
adjudicate the merit of proposed restrictions on a case-by-case basis.119 The Swiss-Japanese 
proposal, which was framed as in the interest of all NFIs, was rejected most fiercely by African 
states that includes the majority of NFIs.120 It turned out that many NFIs rejected the Swiss-
Japanese proposal because it failed to acknowledge the heterogeneity of users of export 
restrictions. These NFIs feared the proposal would limit their future policy space to respond to 
similar food crises. In the July 2008 meeting, WTO members compromised on food export 
restrictions and agreed to strengthen consultation, information sharing and transparency among 
WTO members. A second effort by NFIs, this time a proposal developed by Egypt in the lead up 
to the 2011 WTO Ministerial called for the immediate ban on food export restrictions that would 
negatively affect NFIs and LDCs.121 The Egyptian proposal was supported by a large coalition of 
NFIs and food insecure developing countries, including moral support from Japan and 
Switzerland (which would not have been covered by the proposal). Even non-NFIs such as the 
Philippines supported the proposal and argued that it should apply more broadly to include other 
middle-income developing countries whose food insecurity was adversely affected by food 
export restrictions during the crisis.122 In the lead up to the Ministerial, the US, Australia and 
Brazil blocked the Egyptian proposal claiming that changes to WTO rules on export restrictions 
must be part of the wider agricultural negotiation, not implemented through extraordinary means 
such as an immediate ban on restrictions. Whereas NFIs hoped the Egyptian proposal would be 
included in an “early harvest” at the 2013 Bali Ministerial, export restrictions were not included 
in the final agenda.  
Conventional analyses of the debate of food export restrictions at the WTO largely limit 
themselves to evaluating whether existing proposals and other solutions would enhance 
transparency and reduce world market volatility.123 Yet a critical geopolitics provides an 
alternative reading. Any specific proposal on food export restrictions at the WTO, regardless of 
the merits of its intentions, cannot be understood outside of the wider geopolitical stakes of the 
DDA. Even a small shift on one issue such as export restriction has broader ramifications for 
rescaling power relations in the global agro-food system (hence Argentina’s rejection of the EU 
 
proposal). The inability of NFIs to advance their interests at the WTO can be read in two ways. 
First, agro-powers have a collective interest in preventing the further carving out of exceptions 
for NFIs and expanding differentiation of how WTO rules apply to different categories of states 
beyond what already exists under special and differential treatment. Established and emerging 
agro-powers appear equally vigilant against rebalancing WTO rules in favour of NFIs, which 
they regard as export markets. A second reading is that contests among established and emerging 
agro-powers at the WTO are creating political conditions generally less favourable for NFIs. 
Despite disagreement among agro-powers on the G20/EU proposal, emerging and established 
agro-powers in equal parts rejected the Egyptian proposal and managed to keep food export 
restrictions off the agenda at Bali. Recall that during the Uruguay Round, NFIs were successful 
in securing a side agreement to address rising food prices. In the DDA, where agro-power is far 
more widely distributed between Northern and Southern NFEs, NFIs appear to be fairing less 
well as a group. However, these new power relations at the WTO are also a new source of 
geopolitical struggles. Behind closed doors at the WTO NFIs have criticized emerging agro-
powers for not supporting their interests. Conflict among NFIs and emerging agro-powers over 
export restrictions may be an important rift that could erode the strength of South-South 
bargaining coalitions thus at the WTO (i.e., the Ag-G20).124 In the same instance, the success of 
emerging agro-powers to resist NFIs and established agro-powers’ demands for new rules on 
food export restrictions confirms that geopolitical contests over food security are far more 
polycentric than in the previous GATT/WTO trade rounds. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The WTO is a key site of geopolitical struggle over the global agro-food system. Inter-state 
conflicts over control of the international trade system are decades old; however, the WTO AoA 
was a decisive historical event that institutionalized the geopolitics of the global agro-food 
system. The Global Food Crisis occurred during a moment of deep institutional paralysis at the 
WTO that resulted in a strategic appropriation of the crisis by states and geopolitical agents to 
revive the Doha Round. An unexpected development is the external legitimization of the WTO as 
credible actor on food security through its inclusion into global networks of food security 
policymaking and governance (e.g., HLTF, inter-agency panels). A less surprising but poorly 
understood development is that the Global Food Crisis has resulted in a deeper 
institutionalization of inter-state contests for control of the WTO. Emerging and established 
NFEs and NFIs efforts to reshape WTO rules – the discourse of free-trade-for-food security, 
agricultural dumping, regulating food export restrictions, etc. – confirm heightened rather than 
diminished struggles for control of this geopolitical agent. Agro-powers recognize that the 
Global Food Crisis has shaken the confidence of net-food importers in the multilateral trade 
system.125 At the same time, the Global Food Crisis has raised the geopolitical stakes of the 
WTO by placing food security higher on the DDA negotiating agenda. Recent efforts for an early 
harvest on food security, such as food stockholding, is marked by more fractured geopolitical 
tensions that illustrate reinvigorated inter-state contests for control of the WTO.  
This article contributes to advancing a critical geopolitics approach to the study of power 
in the global agro-food system. The emergence of new agro-powers from the Global South as 
major players in rulemaking at the WTO confirms, and reinforces the shift towards, a new spatial 
reconfiguration of production and power in the global agro-food system towards polycentrism. 
At the WTO, there has been a noticeable shift in the geopolitics of food security since the Global 
 
  
Food Crisis. Debates over increasing opposition by established and emerging agro-powers to the 
SSM and disciplines on food export restrictions illustrates that global food politics are not 
adequately captured by a North-South framing. The analytical use of the categories of NFEs and 
NFIs brings into sharp relief more complex power relations and struggles in the prevailing 
geopolitical food order than is commonly assumed in the literature. The failure of NFIs to obtain 
special food import financing earlier in the DDA and more recently exemptions from food export 
restrictions shows that even though agro-power is presently shared by a larger number of 
Northern and Southern states, such a rescaling of power in the global food system may be 
resulting in conditions less advantageous to the most food insecure states. A transition towards a 
polycentric global agro-food system requires adjusting our analytical gaze to new configurations 
of power, asymmetries and vulnerability; this means taking seriously South-South conflicts but 
also situating pre-existing North-South struggles in a new global context, which may be altering 
both their dynamics and their geopolitical significance.  
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